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Abstract 
I investigate the semantic and practical complexity of social rights, together with the obliga-
tions which correspond to the public authorities in terms of putting them into practice. I 
also discuss the role of meaningful economic equality in the discourse of social rights, 
explaining the points at which the two concepts interact, and the ways that formal equality 
can be improved. Finally, I reach the conclusion that there are two distinct meanings of the 
concept of discrimination, one which is equivalent to any violation of the general principal 
of equality, and another stricter one, which is the infringement of equality when any of the 
proscribed diff erentiating factors are present (race, sex, etc.). " e legal aspect of the man-
date to exercise and guarantee social rights is manifest in the programmed objective, as well 
as in the fact that the measures aimed at this objective are protected from the possibility of 
compliance. 
In this way, social rights constitute subjective rights, representing a programme through 
which goods would be distributed evenly among public, collective and private interests. 
" is results in a singular structure with a special mechanism by which the State has to pro-
vide assistance and services, and create, strengthen and promote the conditions allowing 
individuals and groups to satisfy their needs. " us their obligations are also related to the 
prerequisites for exercising positive liberty. " e main point of departure is that individuals 
are moral subjects endowed with dignity. It defends the idea that we all have real capacity 
for choice and that we all direct our existence towards certain aims in life.
Keywords
social rights, liberty, equality
1. A Starting Point: Some Challenges of Social Rights 
Indeed, with changes that have taken place, the liberal paradigm now con-
siders that members of a society are actors in a market economy which 
*) Consolider-Ingenio 2010. ! e Age of the Rights. CSD2008-00007.
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guarantees the real conditions ensuring individual rights. " us the recog-
nition of an individual right represents the exercise of private autonomy by 
the stipulation of contracts and the acquisition of goods or services from 
others. In this kind of State, the structure of rights assumes that women, 
racial minorities, gays, the disabled etc., fi t into the present scheme for 
‘natural’ reasons, without taking into account the underlying problem.1 
" e process of transformation takes shape in a number of forms: the move 
from formal competence towards substantive content; the use of ‘recogni-
tion rules’ and ‘fundamental and structural values’; the increase in ‘protec-
tion clauses’; the proposals for ‘weighting clauses’, ‘identity’, ‘hierarchy’ and 
‘compensation’ guarantees; the constitutional development of ‘operational 
rules’; and the extension of fundamental rights thank to ‘rules governing 
the applicable law’.2
" ere was no formal mention of constitutionalized social rights until 
the Mexican (1917) and Weimar (1919) Constitutions, which were crea-
ted according to a series of political, economic and ideological factors 
adapted to the industrial and post-industrial age. " e precursors are von 
Stein (Geschichte der sozialen Bewegung, 1850) and his doctrinal mentor 
Heller (Rechtsstaat oder Diktatur, 1929). " e Basic Law of the Federal 
Republic of Germany of 1949, a little later, is also worth highlighting 
because it includes the idea of the social State (articles 20 and 28), with 
demands linked to objectives that increase the reach of liberal States based 
on the rule of law, guaranteeing ‘freedom’, ‘property’, ‘equality’, ‘legal secu-
rity’, and ‘rights of political participation’. In this scheme, the public 
authorities are responsible for providing the citizens with the means which 
individuals need to develop their personalities and integrate socially, elimi-
nating abstentionism.3
" e actions of the State have to be directed towards ensuring individual 
freedom and protecting the autonomous development of subjects. " e State 
organization and its regulation have to be governed by rational principles, 
which can be transferred to the law as a basic element. As a result, this 
system tries to ensure that the State and its organs can only act in accor-
dance with the powers granted them by the legal system, by which they are 
thus limited. In this way, legislation applies to all on an equal basis and 
arbitrariness in public powers is eliminated. 
1) Barcellona 1999, p. 105; Tuori 2000, p. 22.
2) Häberle 2003, p. 108.
3) Díaz 1998, pp. 103, 106; García-Pelayo 1996, pp. 18–20.
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In addition, it should be stressed that fundamental rights form an essen-
tial nucleus within Rules of law in a broad sense, and also constitute an 
essential legitimizing element, whilst demanding and requiring such a Rule 
of law. In this way, since the end of the 18th century, the theory of rights 
has off ered a new form of understanding political power and the dimen-
sion of the State.4 According to the liberal theory of fundamental rights, 
such rights are an individual’s right to freedom in the face of the State. 
" e freedom of individuals, from the legal point of view, precedes public 
authority, which has to ensure the means and institutions needed for its 
legal guarantee. " e fundamental rights as rights to liberty are rules for the 
distribution of competences between individuals (society) and the State. 
" ey delimit the sphere in which individuals and their social structures can 
be trusted to regulate conduct and organize their own maintenance.5
" e liberal concept of rights has its main corollary in Locke’s statement: 
“" e greatest and principal aim which men seek when joining a State or 
communities, and submitting to a government, is to safeguard their goods”.6 
" ese goods belong to all men in an equal way, so that we can say that they 
are individual. " ey consist of life, liberty and property. " e natural order 
unfolds in a set of innate and inviolable rights, and the State has been 
constituted to protect them. It has to adopt the most suitable organic 
structure possible, so that civil rights are the ideal framework for defending 
the sphere of individual sovereignty against any interference by the public 
sphere. Authors such as Bentham, Locke, Mill, Constant and Tocqueville 
stressed negative freedom, placing great importance on protection from 
the State, of a more or less radical nature according to each theory. For the 
neo-liberal tradition, represented by Buchanan, Friedman, Hayek, Nozick, 
Posner and Tullock, the most important point is individual freedom con-
ditioned by the freedom of the market, and defi ned as an instrument of 
convergence between effi  ciency and justice. In this way, the role of the 
State is reduced to that of an arbiter, laying down protective or repressive 
rules, and making use of sanctions in the case of non-compliance. When 
there is a conjunction of legal freedom, the right not to be interfered with 
by the State, and the competence to exercise the right, the State cannot 
interfere with liberty.7 " us the legal, economic and political arguments 
4) De Asís 1999, p. 43; Martínez de Pisón 1997, pp. 31, 32. 
5) Böckenförde 1993, p. 48. 
6) Locke 1982, 9, § 124.
7) Harvey 2005, pp. 64–87. 
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are articulated in a cohesive fashion, postulating an extremely restricted 
role for the State.8
According to this theory, in a liberal rule of law, not only is negative 
liberty what defi nes individual autonomy, but equality also becomes more 
important, at least in one of its aspects, since there is no doubt that the 
concept of equality and its practice are connected with fundamental rights: 
those of liberty (since they are rights to equality with respect to possible 
diff erences) and those of society (since they are rights to the reduction of 
inequalities). With regard to this, Mill stated: 
" e sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in inter-
fering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. " at the 
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civi-
lized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either 
physical or moral, is not a suffi  cient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do 
or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, 
because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right.9
" us if there is an essential equality between all men, based on equal rights 
from birth, one can distinguish from this a formal equality or equality before 
the law, which is linked to a generality and abstraction, separate from per-
sonal, social and economic conditions which may originate from diff eren-
ces in the eff ective enjoyment of rights and freedoms which are regulated 
by law. " is equality which establishes legal certainty, is given practical 
form in the application of the law, an impartial application of legal criteria 
to those who are objects of the rule of law, and in the content of the law, 
relative to the justifi cation and reasonableness of the criteria used legally to 
diff erentiate between individuals. 
Liberalism aims to justify this equality on the premises from which its 
theory is constructed, i.e. from legal equality which is proof of a normative 
individualism. Accordingly, individuals are the subjects of legislation; and 
of an ethical individualism, which explains that they are in some way ratio-
nal and capable of having plans for their lives, interests, and other pursuits, 
and that the satisfaction of these properties is a value.10 " e role which 
the State has to play corresponds to a neutrality in the face of individual
 8) Martínez de Pisón 1996, pp. 242–244. 
 9) Mill 2003, pp. 57–74. 
10) Rivera 1997, pp. 26 and 27. 
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preferences, and the fundamental idea that liberties require an equal treat-
ment for all subjects, men and women, rests on the concept of autonomy. 
2. Arguments for Social Rights 
A legal guarantee is a functional, relational and multidimensional reality 
that can be analysed within a legal system. As far as social rights are con-
cerned, it is necessary to distinguish between the possibilities of technical 
and political realization. Technically they can be guaranteed, because the 
acts required to satisfy them would inevitably be discretional, unable to be 
formalized and would not be susceptible to jurisdictional controls and 
constraints. For that reason, the complexity of guaranteeing social rights is 
essentially political. Ferrajoli talks of ‘primary guarantees,’ of prohibitions 
and obligations that go hand in hand with the rights and, similarly, of the 
relationships that exist between what is permitted and what is prohibited, 
and between what is permitted and what is not compulsory. 11 " e ‘seconda ry 
guarantees’ are related to the responsibilities of the judicial organs to apply 
sanctions or declare annulments, if there are invalid or illegal acts that 
infringe the obligations or prohibitions that constitute the primary guar-
antees. In this way, the question of guarantees means that there are rights 
with a greater degree of resistance than others depending on what the 
authorities have decided. Guastini12 even goes so far as to talk of ‘real rights’ 
and ‘presumed rights’. 
" e rights serve to limit the offi  cial authority in order to add to its defi -
nition and to obtain the support and help it off ers in the form of benefi ts 
and services. In relation to civil society they serve to defend its members 
from the offi  cial authority and from themselves, to be eff ective and surpass 
the natural state, to communicate and establish links between the offi  cial 
authority and the civil society, instead of having the offi  cial authority sepa-
rated from society or a civil society that does not consider the offi  cial 
authority. In short, the purpose of the entire public service must be to 
ensure the enjoyment of rights and promote them.13 We draw the conclu-
sion that the actions of the State which we have set out should be modern-
ized and improved constantly, because, given the growing scarcity of many
11) Ferrajoli 2005, pp. 19–56 y 139–196.
12) Guastini 1994, pp. 133–134.
13) Peces-Barba 1999b, pp. 131–155. 
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goods and having achieved universal social rights, in many cases the demands 
are excessive and impossible to meet. Given the problems that arise when 
determining when someone is entitled to State’s action, the decision-making 
becomes increasingly more complicated.14
" e contemporary concept of equality has its origin in the creation of 
a legal and social order in which the independence of the individual could 
only be obtained by positioning it under the auspices of the legal power 
of the State, with the concept of independence being linked to a formal 
system and economic autonomy. As Rosenfeld highlights, the history of 
constitutional equality is the result of a long and diffi  cult struggle against 
feudal status and privileges. " is is a dialectical struggle divided into three 
stages. In the fi rst, diff erence is a correlate of inequality: “" ose who are 
characterized as diff erent are treated as inferiors or superiors depending on 
their position in the hierarchy”. In the second phase, identity is a correlate 
of equality: “If certain criteria are met, everyone has the right to be treated 
equally”. Finally, diff erence is the correlate: “Any person shall be treated in 
proportion to their needs and aspirations”.15 
Initially, social rights can be defi ned as those which establish a benefi t or 
service for holders of the right. " e benefi t comes mainly from the public 
authorities but also less commonly from individuals.16 " ey take the form 
of rights to substantive equality, i.e. they demand a legal system which 
diff e rentiates according to real inequality, so that this equality is a condi-
tion of the exercise of fundamental rights.17 Given this aim, the problems 
related to guarantees of satisfying these rights diff er from those of other 
classes of rights.18 In this respect, Bovero believes that, neither the constitu-
tionalization nor internationalization of fundamental rights can be reduced 
to theoretical declarations based only on a rigorous distinction between 
them and on their safeguarding.19 " e contradiction between the declara-
tion and the rights themselves must be resolved, in order to determine the 
proper system for guaranteeing the rights. 
14) Donati 1990, pp. 51–81; Eekelaar 2000, pp. 9–28. 
15) Rosenfeld 1996, pp. 161–192.
16) Prieto points out (1998, pp. 72, 73) that this does not always occur, since by its nature, 
the rights to strike and trade union freedom do not involve any provision, unless the public 
protection off ered for them is considered a provision. Other cases would be those related to 
those rights which restrict individual autonomy in employment contracts.
17) Ollero 1989, p. 14. 
18) Ferrajoli 2007, pp. 108, 109. 
19) Bovero 2007, p. 229. 
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" is indicates how pernicious it is if society regulates itself freely: adminis-
trative, economic, decisional, etc., techniques are essential to break the 
autonomy of the systems of State and society. " is connection should be 
grounded in the development or control of systems without which one 
cannot live today, the security of those aspects which are vital for human 
life, and a range of social benefi ts which are guaranteed constitutionally. 
" e social benefi ts can be summarized as follows:
1.  regulation of a minimum wage, revised according to changes in the 
economic situation; a policy of full employment.
2.  care for people who are temporarily or permanently incapacitated for 
work.
3.  career training, supported by a fair distribution of income according 
to the economic situation.20 
" e term ‘social policy’ refers to the institutionalized mechanisms of public 
authorities, or preferential guidelines which frame State responsibility for 
the welfare of its citizens historically and structurally.21 In this respect, using 
the arguments of Barcellona to deepen our understanding of equality, there 
is a link between the transformation of the liberal idea of a State governed 
by the rule of law and the crisis of formal equality, together with the arrival 
of democracy as a substantive principle and procedure. Barcellona com-
ments that substantial inequalities make substantive equality necessary, 
even though there is only the barest outline of a diff erentiated treatment of 
actual situations. " e criticism which he makes is that “the principle of 
substantive equality is the negation of positive law and therefore, of the 
self-created character of imposed rules, precisely because it brings with it a 
reference to criteria of substantive justice and meta-positive elements” . . . 
“It is no coincidence that equality is a form of rule (equal right) and subs-
tantive content of the mandate (equality of diff erent situations). Nor is it 
a coincidence that formal equality (as a means) should exclude the rele-
vance of substantive inequality, and vice versa, that substantial equality (as 
an end) should violate formal equality . . . Paradoxically, equality has to 
negate diversity (hierarchies) but should also prevent homologation (the 
homogenized society). Its duty is to square the circle”.22
20) García-Pelayo 2005, pp. 21–25, 29, 30, in terms of the content of ‘existential provision’ 
defi ned by Forsthoff .
21) Garrido 2007, p. 111.
22) Barcellona 1996, pp. 52, 74.
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Linked to the main discussions which add the satisfaction of social rights 
and programmes of substantive equality, numerous solutions have been 
designed by various authors. Preuss systematizes the strategies into four 
groups: " e fi rst suppresses distributive rights, which are a handicap for 
the market to use its function of assignation. " is proposal is not admissi-
ble because the results would restore the hegemony of the bourgeoisie 
and run the risk of subjecting the working class to the market, making 
political dictatorship a real possibility. " e second lays bare the conversion 
of substantive rights into procedural rights, prejudicial to persons who 
are not capable of pursuing their interests eff ectively because of lack of 
resources. " e third is linked to what has been called ‘responsible right’, 
contained in article 18 of the German Grundesetz, which determines the 
loss of constitutional rights involved in an inappropriate use, i.e. a use 
which takes no account of the negative derivations of the constitutional 
system as a whole, which could devaluate legal claims. " e fourth pertains 
to the ‘teubnerian doctrine’ of ‘refl exive law’ which calls for a constitutiona-
lization of an organizing conscience of organizations in response to social 
demands.23
3. A New Comprehension of Equality for the Realization of Social 
Rights 
" ere is a basic legal equality to which we are all subjects in law, with corres-
ponding rights and obligations. Formal equality is linked to generality and 
abstraction. Applied to rights, this means that we are all equal in terms of 
holding and exercising rights. " e idea of formal justice satisfi es the value 
of equality in the way that subjects to whom rules are applied have to adapt 
to them. " e fact that this equality is relative, depending on the criterion 
that has inspired the rule in question, the number of advantages or disad-
vantages to distribute, and the number of persons aff ected by the rule, does 
not alter the fact that compliance with results in equal treatment.24
Equality as a starting point is identifi ed with formal equality, which 
runs into obstacles which are indirectly protected by law, resulting from 
wealth or chance, which make persons with the same capacity have unequal 
opportunities. Legal equality is indispensable for acquiring real equality in 
a negative sense, given that the concurrence of legal discriminations limit 
23) Preuss 1991, pp. 88, 89.
24) Bobbio 2001, pp. 17, 18; Laporta 1985, pp. 3–31. 
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the objectives which have been set. At the same time, in a positive sense, it 
allows persons to go before the courts to challenge discrimination. How-
ever, formal equality is not suffi  cient. It requires an eff ective application of 
egalitarian laws and laws which safeguard vulnerable areas: the principle of 
‘social equalization’ compensates inequalities by raising or promoting dis-
advantaged people, or limiting or reducing the wealth and power of the 
most fortunate. " e former case off ers positive benefi ts, and the latter nega-
tive ones.25 
Given the idiosyncratic nature of equality and the fact that it starts with 
diversity, its evaluation excludes identity and similarity. Identity deals with 
two distinct subjects, and does not recognize elements which diff er. Simi-
larity does not require diff erentiating elements to be disregarded. When we 
make a judgement regarding equality, we have to make a relational opera-
tion, making clear that something is equal to another thing with which we 
are comparing it. " is point involves a value judgement which considers 
certain facts and inherent inferences.26 A case of equality of treatment 
would be when A and B are treated equally by C, if C gives the same bene-
fi t or specifi c detriment to A and B. Whether A and B receive an equal 
distribution depends on the rule applied. " e principle can be broken 
down into the obligation which the legal system has to prevent a priori any 
form of negative discrimination becoming positive, and implanting posi-
tive discrimination on cases which have traditionally involved situations of 
inequality. In this respect, it is interesting to mention the opinion of Ruiz 
Miguel relating to relative equality rules, determining equal treatment for 
a certain category of persons, inasmuch as this treatment is given to another 
category, and non-relative equality rules, determining the rights and duties 
of various persons without reference to the relationship between them.27
In substantive equality, affi  rmative and negative judgements of equality 
are not absolutely symmetrical. " e fact that two individuals, or classes of 
individuals, are substantially equal is interpreted as a duty to treat them in 
the same way. It is a legal policy directive aimed at legislators or judges. 
According to Guastini, this presupposition can be formulated as a norma-
tive proposition within the terms given as follows: “" ere is at least one 
rule which attributes to ‘x’ and ‘y’ distinct subjective legal situations”. " e 
statement that two individuals, or classes of individuals, are not substan-
25) Fernández Ruiz-Gálvez 1992, pp. 156–158.
26) Prieto 1995, pp. 112–115.
27) Santamaría 1997, p. 295.
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tially equal is made according to the circumstances and the context of the 
discourse. We can use a principle holding to this postulate to express the 
guideline that there has to be diff erent treatment, and to express that 
the subjects, or a group of them, should be made equal.28
" e question which has to be addressed is what the foundation for subs-
tantive equality in the discourse of social rights is. " e answer has to be 
rooted in the response to human needs, which are either themselves not 
negotiable, or are based on circumstances which are not negotiable, and 
which signify a manifestation of the capacity to overcome the limits of 
their existence.29 " ose who do not have their basic needs guaranteed have 
the satisfaction of these needs protected in the form of rights.30 Graphi-
cally, Zimmerling argues that “N is a basic need for x if, and only if,, under 
the circumstances given in the socio-cultural system S in which he lives 
and given the personal qualities P of x, the non-satisfaction of N prevents 
x from carrying out any non-contingent goal, and thus from following his 
overall life plan”. To sum up, a human need is identifi ed by the damage 
which its non-satisfaction produces for the person.31
" e techniques of dealing with equality of substantive treatment are 
equality as ‘equivalence’ and as ‘diff erentiation’. " e former deals with 
the respect and protection of basic needs as an element whose rationality 
and foundation for rights is entirely acceptable. " e latter consists in the 
disappearance of a privilege within its estimation as a fundamental right, 
insofar as: it is interpretable as equality of substantive treatment as equiva-
lence, since the diff erential circumstance is not relevant for creating an 
inequality; it establishes a civil right which obliges the public authorities 
to satisfy a need which cannot be satisfi ed by privation; and it determines 
principles that demand to be dealt with later by legislation.32 On this 
subject, we wonder what distribution leads to adequate compensation, 
given that meeting point between the legal equality defi ned in legislation 
and the action of public authorities to achieve substantive equality is 
far from clear. As Gíménez Glück points out, it is diffi  cult to be precise 
on “when the principle of equality is being complied with”, “when formal 
equality is transgressed in order to achieve substantive equality”, or “when 
28) Guastini 1999, pp. 196–198. 
29) Añón 1994, pp. 191, 193.
30) Añón 1994, pp. 265, 266; Contreras 1994, pp. 52–54.
31) Zimmerling 1990, p. 51; Bayón 1991, pp. 43–45; Martínez de Pisón 1998, p. 166.
32) Añón and García Añón 2002, pp. 153, 154; Peces-Barba 1999a, p. 291.
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the traditional outlines of formally equal treatment is being respected 
scrupulously”.33
" us it is worth outlining the grey area between “diff erences” (characteris-
tics which diff erentiate and at the same time make persons individuals) 
and “inequalities” (disparities between subjects originating in rights related 
to wealth and positions of power or subjection). Despite discrepancies, we 
note that the two concepts, “diff erences,” and “inequalities,” are linked to 
the fundamental rights of liberty, in terms of the equal respect to all diff eren-
ces, and to social rights, in terms of the rights to reduction of inequality.34 
" ese are the reasons for which Rawls insists that the “basic structure of 
society should be organized in such a way that the inequalities in obtaining 
the primary goods of welfare, income, power and authority should be 
aimed at producing the greatest benefi t for the least advantaged in obtaining 
primary goods”. 
" is implies that equality carries with it diversity. As an illustration, 
L. Hierro, following Haussman and McPherson, discusses equality of wel-
fare, equality of resources or primary goods, equality of opportunities for 
welfare, equality of capacity and complex equality.35 From the progressive 
liberal perspective, Rawls bases his argument on a concept of justice applied 
to the basic structure of the political and social system, and associates it 
with two principles: a) that “each person participating in a practice, or 
aff ected by it, has an equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible 
with a like liberty for all”. and b) “inequalities (as permitted and defi ned 
by the pattern of distribution of rights and duties) are arbitrary unless it is 
reasonable to expect that they will work out for everyone’s advantage and 
provided the positions and offi  ces to which they attach, or from which 
they may be gained, are open to all”.36 Rawls’ plan is “to maximize the 
autonomy of each individual separately insofar it does not imply putting 
other individuals in a position of less comparative autonomy”. For Nino, 
this reinforces the principle of personal dignity: the attribution of equal 
value to agreement between normal and adult individuals presupposes an 
equivalence between the possibilities of choice. " us satisfaction of pri-
33) Giménez Glück 1999, pp. 52, 53.
34) Ferrajoli 2006, pp. 82, 83. One should not confuse ‘diff erence’ with ‘inequality’. In this 
duality equality is based on diversity, which is opposed to ‘homogeneity’ and ‘identity’ (De 
Lucas 2000, p. 493). See also Añón Roig 2001. 
35) Hierro 2002, p. 96. 
36) Rawls 2001, pp. 104, 105.
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mary goods determines individual well-being.37 " e work Political Libera-
lism not only introduces elements of justice, but also the objective basis for 
comparing individual situations of well-being between citizens.38
Dworkin presents an alternative of equality of resources, in a much less 
fl exible position. Dworkin maintains that “given that liberal equality depends 
on economic and political mechanisms which reveal the real costs of oppor-
tunity of impersonal resources, an egalitarian society must be a free society. 
Invasions of liberty, such as criminal legislation which prohibits activities 
or styles of life that some people may wish to live or carry out, constitute 
invasions of equality, unless the need for them is justifi able, to protect an 
egalitarian distribution of resources and opportunities, providing security 
for persons or property, or for some other reason”.39
According to Rawls and Dworkin, what is important is that there should 
be equality in satisfying basic needs allowing all persons to act as moral 
agents within a context, with an index which would postulate as a mini-
mum that “justice would demand to satisfy all equally”. Believing that no 
action which increased the distance from this minimum postulate would 
be justifi ed, although equality could increase overall, the principle of diff e-
rence would justify all kinds of actions which would take place and bring 
closer to the absolute minimum people who were at a lower level, despite 
the fact that the package of measures adopted represented a greater inequality. 
L. Hierro argues that if justice and eff ectiveness are related, it would have 
to be seen if it is possible to set a limit according to the satisfaction of the 
basic needs of the most advantaged members of society.40
" e formula “for any good X, the just method of distribution consists in 
dividing X into equal parts” is a summary of egalitarianism, and enhances 
the rules of “to each the same” and “to all equally”. " e criticism made is 
that, bearing in mind that equal distribution is not always just, a distribu-
tion which allows the exercise of equal rights is just given the problem 
of shortage of goods. It corrects the preceding axioms through the joint 
maxims that “everyone has a right to a minim level of life, and the goods 
should be distributed in such a way that equal rights are satisfi ed”, according 
to the concepts of ‘minimum level of life’, ‘quality of life’, ‘basic needs’ and 
37) Nino 1989, pp. 345, 346.
38) On the commentary of the work of Rawls 2005, see J. Martínez de Pisón 1998, pp. 152, 
153. 
39) Dworkin 1993, pp. 89, 90; Dworkin 2000, pp. 75–131.
40) Hierro 2002, pp. 96–99, 102.
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‘levels of life’.41 To defi ne substantive equality between individualism and 
collectivism as a basis for social rights, we have to maintain that it is 
based on ‘equality to achieve a goal’. Substantive equality, and equality 
of substantive treatment, aspires to moral liberty, without forgetting the 
proper use of social, political and legal liberty and the rights which are 
based on it.42
In the words of Prieto Sanchís, the achievement of real equality by legal 
diff erentiations or inequalities is not obtained only through benefi ts. In 
addition, as we explained above, to know if something is equal it must be 
valued in relation to something else, using criteria which explain whether 
there are reasons for a diff erent treatment. " e key lies in deciding which 
real inequalities are arguable, and whether they are important enough to 
represent a suffi  cient reason when it comes to diff erent treatment.43 
4. Final Note 
To sum up, understanding social rights is a dynamic and complex ques-
tion. " is complexity can be seen in the role played within the traditional 
decision-making powers governed by rules of exclusive and excluding com-
petences. To this scheme can be added civil society and international 
bodies which create and strengthen new relations.44 Following J.S. Mill 
and Bentham, distributive justice is summarized according to the state-
ment: “Between various possible distributions, a just distribution is that 
which proportions the greatest happiness possible to the greatest number 
of people”. " e problems arise because there are situations which oppose 
equality and which are not solved by utilitarianism; there are also inevita-
ble inconveniences in an economic system in which supply and demand 
play a decisive role.45
We accept the defi ning argument of L. Hierro on equality, saying that 
“there has to be adequate resources among all human beings to satisfy basic 
needs, leaving each to develop his life plan in a similarly autonomous and 
free way”.46 " e tension between equality in practice and in law gives rise 
41) Bobbio 1976, pp. 321–330. 
42) Peces-Barba 1999a, pp. 289, 290; D. Giménez Glück 1999, pp. 45, 46. 
43) Prieto 1998, pp. 81, 84, 90.
44) Barcellona 1996, p. 23.
45) Quintana 1994, p. 30–35.
46) Hierro 1995, p. 137.
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to a clash between principles. " e problems that arise from these contra-
dictions between theory and practice should be resolved using the tech-
niques of deliberation. In answer to the question whether there is a general 
rule of preference, the answer lies in equality and not in diff erentiation. 
“" ere is always a reason for equality. " us equality should be proposed so 
long as some real inequality does not off er a reason allowing or, depending 
on the confl icting arguments, imposing a diff erentiating regulation”.47
" ere is a complementarity between equal opportunities and the achieve-
ment of substantial equality which justifi es diff erentiated treatment as long 
as there is social inequality, so that minority groups do not remain margina-
lized.48 " e transcendent importance of health, food, education, housing 
and culture is clear and manifest. At other times there are needs whose 
relevance does not seem so clear.49 In this case, Jori is right when he sug-
gests that equality in legal capacity consists of “equal capacity to arrive at 
being unequal,” as a way of putting into action “liberty as autonomy”. As 
a footnote, the right to become and continue to be owner or debtor creates 
its guarantees related to the protection and ethical nature of the right to 
property or credit. " e frontiers between fundamental and ownership 
rights have yet to be defi ned.50
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